Three cases. Three countries. One direction.

Turkish companies can now lose an EU public tender before their technical capability, price or experience is fully examined.

The decisive reason may simply be their legal status: they come from a country without a reciprocal public procurement agreement with the European Union.

This is already producing real consequences.

Croatia: Kolin lost both the contract and equal-treatment protection

Kolin participated in a Croatian railway infrastructure tender worth approximately €228 million.

The contract went to Strabag. Kolin challenged the procurement process.

But on 22 October 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union changed the legal position for all Turkish bidders.

The Court ruled that Turkish companies cannot use EU procurement directives to demand treatment equal to EU companies. Türkiye’s Customs Union with the EU does not provide that protection.

The Kolin judgment did not declare the company technically weak. It did not find that Turkish engineering was inadequate.

It found that a Turkish bidder had no EU-law right to insist on equal treatment.

That distinction is critical.

Poland: Bozankaya was removed before the final competition

Bozankaya’s trams already carry passengers in European cities, including Timișoara and Iași.

That experience did not protect the company in Poland.

In 2026, Bozankaya was excluded from a tender for up to 20 zero-emission trains. Siemens, Škoda and Pesa remained in the competition.

The reported basis was not a failure to meet a technical requirement.

It was Bozankaya’s position as a Turkish company from a country that is not covered by the EU’s reciprocal procurement agreements.

The message is direct:

A Turkish company may have European references, a compliant product and a competitive price—and still fail to reach the final evaluation.

Romania: the merits of the objection were never examined

The pattern continued in Ploiești.

Bozankaya challenged the result of a tram tender worth about €50 million. Romania’s procurement review body initially accepted the challenge and required a reassessment.

The competing Romanian manufacturer appealed.

On 13 July 2026, the Ploiești Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Astra Vagoane Călători. Bozankaya’s position was rejected as inadmissible. The decision was final, and the substance of its complaints was not examined. At the time of writing, the court’s reasoned judgment had not been published. The reported court outcome is available here.

First, Turkish companies lost guaranteed equal-treatment protection.

Then they began losing tenders on that basis.

Now, in some disputes, their substantive arguments may never be heard.

This is not a judgment on Turkish capability

None of these cases proves that Turkish companies lack technology, experience or production capacity.

The problem comes earlier.

Under the Kolin judgment, Turkish bidders do not have a guaranteed right to enter EU procurement procedures on the same terms as protected bidders.

If admitted, they cannot automatically rely on EU procurement directives to demand equal treatment.

The Court confirmed the wider framework in its CRRC Qingdao Sifang judgment of 13 March 2025.

In the absence of an applicable EU measure, the contracting authority decides whether an unprotected third-country operator should be admitted. It may also apply different treatment to reflect that operator’s different legal position.

The authority does not first need to prove that the company lacks experience, capacity or technical compliance.

The legal position comes before the technical evaluation.

That is why this is more dangerous than an ordinary tender loss.

A company can improve its product. It can reduce its price. It can strengthen its references.

None of those actions alone repairs an access problem.

Rail produced the first visible casualties. The risk is much wider.

This is not only about trains and trams.

The same legal position can affect Turkish companies seeking EU public contracts in:

• Construction and infrastructure

• Transport equipment

• Machinery and industrial systems

• Energy and electrical equipment

• Automotive and specialised vehicles

• Technology and public services

• Components supplied through European consortia

It also affects European companies.

An EU contractor may include a Turkish company because it offers better pricing, available capacity or specialised technology. But if the Turkish partner’s role is structured incorrectly, the entire commercial model may become exposed.

The Turkish company may not be the lead bidder. It may be a consortium member, major subcontractor, supplier or technology partner.

That does not make the issue disappear.

It changes the analysis.

The same Turkish company can be excluded from one tender and essential to another

This is the point most companies still miss.

The same manufacturer can be:

• Excluded as a direct bidder

• Accepted under different conditions

• Used through an EU-led consortium

• Positioned as a specialised subcontractor

• Integrated through licensed production or local assembly

• Supported by a European service and delivery structure

The correct model depends on the tender, contracting authority, product, country of origin, financing and contractual role.

There is no standard answer.

Changing the company name on the bid is not a strategy. Creating a European sales office is not enough. Adding an EU partner at the last minute may also fail.

The structure must be commercially real and legally defensible.

Admission is only the first test

Even when a Turkish company is admitted, further risks remain.

For certain EU tenders worth at least €250 million, foreign financial contributions of at least €4 million from one non-EU country over the previous three years may trigger notification under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation. The European Commission can also request a review below those thresholds. An award may be blocked while that review is pending.

Origin must also be proven.

A product described as Turkish may contain European engineering, Asian components and software owned in another country. Decision-makers need to know where every critical system comes from and whether an alternative supplier can be used.

Delivery must be credible as well.

Who controls engineering changes? Who manages certification? Where are spare parts held? Who provides maintenance and software support? Who carries warranty and delay risk?

These are not secondary paperwork questions.

They decide whether Turkish capability creates an advantage or imports a new exposure into the European bid.

Waiting for the tender notice is already too late

The decisive choices are usually made before submission:

• Whether to bid

• Which company should lead

• What role the Turkish partner should hold

• Which legal protections actually apply

• How financing and origin will be documented

• Which responsibilities must sit in Europe

• How regulatory and delivery risk will be allocated

If this assessment starts during the final legal review, the consortium may already be fixed. Engineering costs may already have been committed. The price may already depend on a structure that cannot be defended.

The first question is therefore not:

“Can we prepare this bid?”

It is:

“Can this company enter this tender in this role—and still protect the commercial objective?”

Red Apple already works at this exact interface

This is not a new or theoretical subject for Red Apple.

Yiğit Belin brings more than 20 years of experience in international transport projects. His work since 2008 has included international rail projects, followed by electric buses and sustainable public transport since 2013. His background covers tendering, contracts, business development, project delivery and international partnerships.

Red Apple applies that experience to the point where Turkish industrial capability meets European procurement risk. Where EU legal or regulatory assessment is required, it works with European partner advisers to test whether the proposed structure can operate in the target market.

The objective is not to place a Turkish company into every tender.

It is to give management a clear answer:

Proceed. Change the structure. Reduce the role. Replace the financing. Strengthen the European operating model. Or do not bid.

Turkish companies are not being rejected because they suddenly lost their capability.

They are being rejected because capability alone no longer protects access.

For companies considering an EU tender, consortium or supply arrangement involving Türkiye, a pre-bid access and structure assessment can be discussed through redapple.world or yigitbelin.com.

Turkish Companies Eliminated from EU Tenders